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MORALS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
Richard C. Fulleri
What are the possibilities of the
criminal law as an agency of social
control in contemporary American life?
No satisfactory answer to this question
can be ventured until we have explored
the intricate relationships which exist
between current patterns of morality
and the prohibitions of criminal stat-
utes. Roscoe Pound has long insisted
that the law in action is greatly in-
fluenced if not determined by custom
and public opinion.2 Yet we sometimes
forget his dictum in our zeal to criticize
the shortcomings of such law enforce-
ment agencies as the police and crim-
inal courts.
It is the objective in this paper to
examine the role played by the crim-
inal law in a dynamic and highly
differentiated society such as ours and
to suggest certain problems which arise
when we resort to new criminal legis-
lation in order to enforce standards of
morality held by certain groups in the
general population.
Legal Conception of Crime
A crime, considered as a legal cate-
gory, is an act punishable by the state.
For conduct to be considered criminal
in this legal sense, it must be something
more than the violation of group moral-
ity or custom. A person's conduct may
deviate from some social norm and be
regarded as eccentric, bad manners,
highly improper, or even downright
immoral, but it is not criminal conduct
I University of Michigan, Department of So-
ciology.
in the legal aspect unless it is also a
deviation from the criminal code estab-
lished and enforceable by the state.
This juridical conception of crime
has its logic in expediency, rather than
in sociological realism. It conveniently
delimits misconduct which is the do-
main of police, prosecutor and judge
from misconduct which must be regu-
lated exclusively by the pressures of
public opinion. Sociologically speak-
ing, however, a criminal statute is
simply the formal embodiment of some-
one's moral values (usually the group
dominant in political authority) in an
official edict, reinforced with an official
penal sanction. Moreover, the mere
fact that a given act is made punish-
able by law does not settle the question
of the immorality of the prohibited
conduct; it does not preclude people
from passing moral judgments on the
rightfulness or wrongfulness of the
behavior. The dominant group whose
values are expressed in the law is only
one of many groups which are inte-
grated in the moral and political fabric
of the community. When the moral
values of one or more of these other
groups are not -in accord with the moral
values of the dominant group we are
likely to have a persistent problem of
law enforcement. Thus viewed, the
problem of the criminal law in action
reduces to the problem of conflicting
moral values held by different groups
and classes in the community.
2 See Criminal Justice in America, New York,
1930.
[624]
MORALS AND CRIMINAL LAW
"Criminal" and "Immoral" Not
Always Synonymous
If we are to study crime in its widest
social setting, we will find a variety of
conduct which, although criminal in
the legal sense, is not offensive to the
moral conscience. of a considerable
number of persons. Traffic violations
do not often brand the offender as
guilty of moral turpitude. In fact, the
recipient of a traffic ticket is usualy
simply the butt of some good-natured
joking by his friends. Newspapers in
reporting chronic traffic violators who
come before the courts are prone to
play up the humorous rather than the
ominous side of such incidents. Al-
though there may be indignation among
certain groups of citizens against gam-
bling and liquor law violations, these
activities are often tolerated if not open-
ly supported by numerous residents of
the community. Indeed, certain church
groups and service clubs regularly con-
duct *gambling games and lotteries for
the purpose of raising funds. Profes-
sional gamblers rationalize that there
cannot be anything very unethical
about their games when "legitimate"
groups are in the same business.
With social drinking now morally
acceptable in most communities, the
operation of drinking emporiums dur-
ing prohibited hours, the sale of liquor
to minors, and many other infractions
of local liquor laws are regarded by
many with -apathy, if not approval.
Some communities tolerate such con-
ditions in order to profit from the
license fees paid by those who operate
such dispensaries.3 Even brothels,
which normally carry a stigma of dis-
3 The town council in one small Michigan com-
munity recently renewed the license of a saloon
operator who was flagrantly violating the law
repute, are in some of our municipal-
ities accepted with a shrug by citizens
who are inclined to view them as
inevitable appurtenances of the com-
munity. The thousand and one forms
of political graft and corruption which
infest our urban centers only sporadi-
cally excite public condemnation and
official action.
Role of Public Opinion
There are several reasons why the
criminal behavior in the examples cited
is not regarded as immoral by general
community consensus. Such deviations
simply do not carry the same oppro-
brium of vicious immorality as do other
offenses such as murder, kidnapping,
rape, arson, and robbery. They do not
threaten our physical and pecuniary
survival in the same way as do the
more heinous offenses against person
and property. Even more significant
is the fact that such violations are
essential to the normal conduct of
business of persons engaged in liquor,
gambling, and vice enterprises. More-
over, the direct pecuniary interest of
these entrepreneurs is shared indirect-
ly by innumerable public officials and
plain citizens whose bread and butter
are dependent upon the continued
operation of such commercial activities.
Finally, the survival of these forms of
crime is made possible by the patronage
of a public whose personal tastes and
morals diverge from the values ex-
pressed in the criminal law.
So far as the support of public opin-
ion is concerned, the situation is much
the same in a relatively new sphere of
criminal definitions-that of business
because, in the words of one councilman: "We
need the fee to pay for our new fire truck."
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and industrial relations. Offenses of
this character include violations of laws
pertaining to trusts and combines, in-
surance, marketing of securities, traffic
in food and drugs, the employment of
children, collective bargaining, and
wage and hour standards. The broker
who profits from an illegal stock or
insurance transaction, the employer of
child labor contrary to government
codes, the anti-union boss who flaunts
the National Labor Relations Act, the
manufacturer who defiantly violates
wage and hour legislation-all are en-
gaging in criminal behavior in the legal
sense. But are these persons regarded
as immoral or anti-social in their con-
duct by the community in general?
With respect to these white-collar
crimes of businessmen, there is usually
no militant and community-wide public
opinion which will reinforce the legal
sanction and put down the legally
wrongful behavior.4 The social phi-
losophy underlying recent govern-
mental regulations of' employer-em-
ployee and buyer-seller relations is
not yet understood, much less accepted
by the general public. Indeed, as
regards conduct in business, there is
a "live and let live" attitude abroad in
the community. Business relations
have traditionally been left to individ-
ual enterprise and there are a great
many who feel that if business is to
prosper personal conscience rather than
public conscience should be the arbiter
in these matters.
The degree to which the sphere of
condict defined as criminal coincides
4In his discussion of white-collar criminality,
E. H. Sutherland has shown that the community
is not organized solidly against such behavior.
The law is pressing in one direction, and
other forces are pressing in the opposite direc-
tion. In business, the 'rules of the game' conflict
with the sphere defined as immoral
depends upon the relative homogeneity
of moral values within the society
represented in any political jurisdic-
tion. Theoretically, in a primitive
society where there is almost complete
agreement on moral values the public
opinion enforced mores for all prac-
tical purposes comprise the unwritten
criminal code of the tribe. What is
immoral is by hypothesis criminal. In
societies other than the primitive where
there is little social change, such as the
small rural communities of early nine-
teenth century America, there would
likewise be a very small area of crim-
inal conduct not defined as immoral.
In advanced, industrialized societies,
characterized by urbanization, where
there is only a small dore of common
values, surrounded by numerous con-
flicting codes of behavior, the sphere
of conduct generally agreed upon as
wrongful grows smaller as the segmen-
tation and differentiation of the society
continues. Yet the number of criminal
laws rapidly increases.
No Cohesive Opinion-Many Laws
As societies become more differen-
tiated and complex, opinion enforced
mores no longer suffice to guarantee
uniform norms of conduct. With in-
creasing disparity in values some com-
mon denominator for conduct is needed
and hence resort is made to the codes
of the criminal law which apply to
everyone within the same political
jurisdiction. Not only are the older
and generally accepted mores which
with the legal rules . . . The Better Business
Bureaus and Crime Commissions, composed of
business and professional men, attack burglary,
robbery, and cheap swindles, but overlook the
crimes of their own members." "White-Colar
Criminality," American Sociological Review, VoL
5, No. 1, p. 11 (February, 1940).
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punish such offenses as murder, rape,
and robbery perpetuated in the crim-
inal code, but a host of new laws spring
up which seek to define new areas of
behavior where conduct is impinging
on the values held by the group in
dominant political authority. Suther-
land and Gehlke, examining the essen-
tial trends in the criminal laws of the
United States between 1900 and 1930,
discovered very little increase in crim-
inal laws. dealing with the "bolder
offenses"---the felonies such as murder,
robbery, rape, assault, and arson upon
which there is very. general agreement
in any community that they are threats
to the general welfare. The large in-
crease in criminal laws has come pre-
cisely in an area of behavior where
there is no cohesive public opinion
branding the conduct as immoral. It
is an area of disparate and conflicting
values such as public morals, business
ethics, and standards of health and
public safety.5 Even more recently the
great depression facilitated new defini-
tions of offenses in tax and banking
laws, social insurance legislation, and
collective bargaining regulations." Such
social legislation, perhaps acquiesced
to in principle by the masses, opposed
in principle by powerful business
groups, and often militantly supported
only by a vigorous minority of socially'
conscious individuals, gives rise to an
entirely new sphere of criminal be-
havior.
Origin of Pressure Groups
This trend toward new criminal defi-
nitions presents a neat dilemma so far
5E. H. Sutherland, and C. E. Gehlke, "Crime
and Punishment," Chap. 22 in Recent Social
Trends in the United States, pp. 1116-1120, New
York, 1933.
i See Thorsten Sellin, Research Memorandum
as law enforcement is concerned. When
a modem community is faced with new
conditions such as traffic hazards,
liquor and gambling institutions open
to all ages and classes of the population,
consumer exploitation by business
interests, cut-throat business competi-
tion, oppression of wage labor by em-
ployers, those whose values are shocked
by such conditions feel that they can-
not wait until there is a spontaneous
ground-swell of community indigna-
tion. Indeed, if all groups in the
population frowned on such practices
there would be little need of any
criminal legislation to suppress them.
So the socially minded reformers, or
special groups whose interests are
being hurt, although often numerically
in the minority, put pressure on the
legislatures to outlaw the disapproved
of behavior. Our parliamentary democ-
racy is so constituted that much of our
legislation is, in fact, the legislation of
well-organized, articulate, and power-
ful minorities. Such minorities, in
effect, become the dominant groups in
casting the new moral molds of the
criminal law. The notion that legis-
latures, in enacting new criminal
legislation, are intervening for the
"common good" or "general welfare"
cannot be reconciled with the harsh
realism of our politics. Such interven-
tion is usually simply the result of
effective pressure exerted by some
group with important political in-
fluence.7 Yet without general com-
munity support for the moral values
expressed in these laws, enforcement
proves a troublesome problem and the
on Crime in the Depression, pp. 6-7, Social Sci-
ence Research Council, New York, 1937.
7See Harwood I Childs, Pressure Groups and
Propaganda, American Academy of Political and
Social Sciences, Philadelphia, 1936.
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criminal definition may prove to be
nothing more than a paper law, not a
law in action.
"Moral" and "Ameliorative" Problems
It is probably true that our criminal
codes do contain the moral minimum
of our day and age. That is to say,
those values which we hold most sacred
and least dispensable are elevated by
public opinion to the status of protec-
tion by the criminal law. Thus, many
of the statutory enactments of our
modern criminal codes merely redefine
as cr'minal certain behavior which for
many generations has been outlawed
by the unwritten mores of our ances-
tors. These moral minima are found
in the many criminal laws which pun-
ish offenses against property, such as
burglary and robbery; against the
person, such as murder, assault, and
rape; aganst the marriage institution,
such as incest and bigamy; against
public order and decency, such as dis-
turbing the peace and public immoral-
ity; against the state, such as insur-
rection and treason. All these instances
represent behavior which the vast ma-
jority of the community deems to be
injurious to its best interests, welfare,
and survival. No matter what an indi-
vidual's age, sex, race, nationality, reli-
gion, or income, he will likely subscribe
to the moral values protected by such
laws. Offenses of this type are con-
demned by all "respectable" and
"right-thinking" citizens, and even
,Even where there is a basic agreement
throughout the community that the conduct is
wrongful, there is not likely to be the same
unanimity of opinion as to what should be done
with the offender. Social attitudes come into con-
flict over such provocative issues as capital pun-
ishment, probation and parole, prison industries,
the juvenile court, and prevention programs.
Popular sentiments addicted to traditional poli-
abhorred by criminals themselves when
committed against members of their
in-group. There are no well-organized
pressure groups contending openly in
community forum for legal approval
of such conduct. Rather, the conduct
is not only criminal by legal definition
but also by the common moral defini-
t:on of the community. The "social
problem" involved in crimes of this
type is amelilorative rather than moral
in nature. That is to say, the problem
is not one of convincing the community
that such behavior is wrongful and that
it should be put down. Rather, the
essential difficulty is one of ameliora-
tion, of working out solutions and
getting people to agree upon programs
of prevention and penology."
On the other hand, contemporary
criminal codes go far beyond the moral
minimum in prohibiting various forms
of conduct which are not viewed as
wrongful by important groups and
classes in the community. Violations
of such laws constitute a second type
of offenses which exploit a high thresh-
old of community tolerance or endorse-
ment. Crimes of this category are
exemplified by circumvention of new
social legislation, bribery of public
officials to secure favorable contracts
and legislation, fraud and misrepresen-
tation in the. financial statements of
corporations, manipulations on the -
stock exchange, embezzlement and mis-
application of funds, illegal transactions
of public utility companies, gambling
cies of punishment and retribution obstruct ef-
fective programs of control based upon newer
conceptions of individualized treatment and re-
habilitation. See Lokan Wilson, "Public Opinion
and the Individualized Treatment of Criminals,"
The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,
VoT- 28, No. 5, pp. 674-683 (January-February,
1938).
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syndicates, liquor law violations, and
commercialized vice. These crimes are
committed either by white-collar upper-
class businessmen who have the respect
of most of the community, or by organ-
ized criminal rings which have the
support and patronage of a sizeable
segment of the citizenry. White-collar
crime and organized racketeering are
not in the first instance ameliorative
problems, Rather they are moral
problems, because the fundamental
issue'is the moral unwillingness of the
community as a whole to organize to
put down wrong. No questions of pre-
vention or punishment can arise until
there has been effective action by law
enforcement officials backed by an
indignant community opinion. Crimes
in this moral category persist because
the violations themselves are an inte-
gral part of the community pattern of
living. "Good" citizens may abhor the
corruption of their public officials, pro-
test the illegal practices of bankers,
doctors, and business executives, and
they are even more likely to rise
against organized gambling and vice.
The fact remains that these practices
and practitioners are woven into the
economic and moral fabric of the-com-
munity as an established part of
"business as usual," and because of this
people cannot agree on the basic moraf
question of whether or not such con-
duct should be tolerated.
So it is that in contemporary society
behavior often comes to be defined as
criminal where the opinion of many
individuals and groups is not in sup-
port of the definition. This is perhaps
inevitable in any culture which is split
into so many 'diversified groups having
so very little in common, but it is
manifest that legal controls alone will
not suffice to guarantee the high
standards of moral behavior desired by
those who support a given law. If the
criminal definitions are to become in-
corporated into our central core of
moral sanctions, many more people,
representative of the community as a




It is not that the law must in all
instances wait for widespread moral
support. It is possible that the" very
administration of the law itself, if
wisely undertaken, may serve as a
technique of popular education through
which to mold opinion in its favor. The
enforcement ofa law inevitably awak-
ens popular, discussion as to its merits.
This is the case with some of the recent
social legislation such as the Securities
and Exchange Act regulating transac-
tions on the stock exchange. Moreover,
even in the instance of a very unpop-
ular law, people are likely to observe
it for some time after its passage simply
because it is the law of the land. We
have respect for the law, as an institu-
tion, even though we may have little or
no respect for a specific legal measure.
There were instances where even the
much despised Prohibition act was
obeyed in letter and in spirit by socially
responsible citizens whose sentiments
were not in accord with the law itself.
But we cannot depend upon the habit
of law obedience exclusively. Ulti-
mately the problem is one of supple-
menting the political sanctions of the
law, which operate through threat of
punishment more or less externally on
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individuals, with spontaneous moral
sanctions which operate on the habits,
attitudes, and conscience of individ-
uals. Moral sanctions rarely originate
in legislatures, but rather in the more
primary social groupings of the fam-
ily, neighborhood discussion groups,
school and church. Even where the
law is so technical or specialized in
subject matter that it must necessarily
come in advance of an enlightened
public opinion, as in the case of public
health measures and conservation of
game statutes, it has little chance of
permanent success so long as its social
objectives remain unintelligible to the
general public.
Education Versus the "Big Stick"
Should we not rely less on the "big
stick" of the law and more on tech-
niques of popular education to the
values implicit in the law? There are
significant instances where the dom-
inant group has not stopped with
control by legal fiat, but has sought by
other methods to educate persistent
offenders to its way of thinking. Wit-
ness traffic schools for adults and
programs of safety instruction for child
pedestrians; temperance movements
supplementing legal restrictions on the
liquor business; conservation films and
lectures explaining the objectives of
new fishing and hunting regulations;
and the intensive educational programs
of the Federal government relative to
new social insurance, wage and hour,
9 A. R. Lindesmith and IL Warren Dunham
have suggested that criminals be classified for
sociological investigation according to the degree
and collective bargaining laws. These
appeals are directed to the self-interest
of individuals as well as to their social
conscience, but in any case they seek
to lighten the burdensome problem of
law enforcement by changing obstruc-
tive attitudes and values. Many more
experiments in this direction will likely
replace the "crack down and educate
later" technique which has too often
characterized our passion for legislat-
ing against thiflgs which we do not like.
Conclusion
Sociologists interested in the problem.
of crime in contemporary America
should further explore the implications
of this relationship between moral and
legal patterns. We have been prone to
think of crime too much in terms of its
legalistic aspects, and too little in terms
of its community or cultural sources.
The behavior of a criminal is always
abnormal or atypical in the restricted
sense that it is a deviation from some
social norm established in the criminal
law, but it is perfectly normal and
typical when it subscribes to some
cultural conduct norm other than that
implicit in the' law.9 If we are to do
away with the forms of crime which
are supported by the cultural values
of the community, we must change
these values. The failure of legal con-
trols to eradicate such behavior is
merely symptomatic of our failure to
alter fundamentally the real source of
the conduct which we condemn.
and manner in which their crimes are related to
or spring from cultural definitions. "Some Prin-
ciples of Criminal Typology," Social Forces, Vol.
19, No. 3 (March, 1941).
